The distributional consequences of rent seeking by Angelopoulos, Angelos et al.
The distributional consequences of rent seeking∗
Angelos Angelopoulos, Assistant Professori
Konstantinos Angelopoulos, Associate Professorii,iii
Spyridon Lazarakis, Assistant Professoriv,a Apostolis Philippopoulos, Professori,iii
May 16, 2021
Abstract
We analyse the distributional effects of rent seeking via the financial sector in
a model calibrated to US data. Rent seeking implies a misallocation of resources
that increases wealth inequality among non rent seekers and for the whole econ-
omy. A deterioration in institutional quality implying more rent seeking leads to
welfare losses for non rent seekers, especially for those with higher earnings and
initial wealth, because they are most affected by the deterioration of the aggregate
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1 Introduction
The importance of institutional quality for economic outcomes is widely accepted.1 Re-
cently, the literature has highlighted the role of the quality of institutions governing the
financial sector, regarding activities to acquire influence (e.g. lobbying) and so extract
extra rents (e.g. Igan et al. (2012, 2017), Stiglitz (2012), Mazzucato (2018) and Igan
and Lambert (2019)). Rent seeking activities imply social costs, effi ciency losses and poor
macroeconomic performance.2 In addition, when households are heterogeneous, rent seek-
ing activities can have distributional implications affecting inequality (e.g. Chakraborty
and Dabla-Norris (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2015), Chaturvedi (2017)). Inequality is also
related to the financial sector via market incompleteness, which links idiosyncratic income
shocks to wealth inequality in a rich literature since Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and
Aiyagari (1994).
This paper examines the effects of rent seeking, via the financial sector, on wealth
inequality and the distribution of implied welfare gains/losses across the population, em-
ploying a model of incomplete financial markets. In this model, in addition to differences
in earnings due to idiosyncratic shocks, households’ incomes and wealth can differ be-
cause of Tullock-type rent seeking competition via the financial market. In particular,
weak exogenous institutions create a contestable prize or a common pool, which is com-
prised of a proportion of aggregate savings. Households (or a subset of them) can then
compete with each other for a share of this prize in a Tullock (1980) type rent-seeking
contest. The quantity of extracted resources increases with one’s wealth relative to the
aggregate wealth of rent seekers. However, rent seeking comes at a private cost; each
household needs to spend part of the proceeds from rent seeking as fees to the rent seek-
ing intermediation sector, which captures the services of law, financial, or lobbying firms
that facilitate the extraction of rents. Rent seeking intermediation firms need to utilise a
share of the economy’s labour force to provide these services. At the household level, the
cost of these services and the contestable prize are taken as given. In general equilibrium,
however, rent seeking reduces capital and labour available for productive uses, and this
affects prices and leads to a deterioration of aggregate outcomes.
It is recognised that rent-seeking competition favours elites (see, e.g. the literature
reviewed in Acemoglu et al. (2015)) that are typically associated with higher socio-
political power and relative wealth. For example, they may have a better insider position
in financial markets. Therefore, we allow for the possibility that only a subset of the
population extract resources via the rent seeking competition and let this group (or class)
of rent seekers be defined by conditions that reflect non-economic, socio-political factors
or by relative wealth. The former implies an exogenous determination of the rent seeking
class (a form of exclusive rent seeking), whereas in the latter, this group is endogenously
determined, and in particular, only those with high enough assets can benefit from rent
seeking (a form of inclusive rent seeking).
We calibrate the model to the US, using measures of financial intermediation costs
and the share of the labour force working in occupations that research has linked to rent
1See, e.g. North (1990), Hall and Jones (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Drazen (2000), Dixit
(2004), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu (2009), Besley and Persson (2009), Besley and Ghatak (2010),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) and many others.
2See, e.g. Tullock (1967, 1980), North (1990), Murphy et al. (1991), Drazen (2000), Mueller (2003),
Hillman (2009), Esteban and Ray (2011), Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) and many others.
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seeking intermediation. When the population fraction with access to benefits from rent
seeking is set exogenously, we assume that its size is 10%. This is motivated by the
proportion of elementary and secondary school-aged children enrolled in private schools
(see NCES (2019)).3 When this fraction is defined endogenously based on relative wealth,
it is motivated by empirical evidence that 10% of the population holds more than 90% of
the financial assets in the US (see Kuhn et al. (2020)). We will also present results from
a calibration of the model that implies that everyone belongs to the rent seeking class,
without any barriers to rent seeking, to contextualise the importance of such barriers. To
identify winners and losers of rent seeking, we start from a baseline economy without rent
seeking and then study the aggregate and distributional implications of a gradual and
deterministic deterioration in institutional quality.
The results suggest that a worsening of institutional quality implies more rent seeking
activity and wealth inequality, consistent with the relationships we observe in the data and
study in more detail in Section 2. The potential extra income from rent seeking stimulates
household savings and wealth accumulation for the group of rent seekers, reducing the
relative importance of stochastic earnings on wealth accumulation. In particular, the
impact of variation in earnings on variation in wealth is reduced, which implies lower
wealth inequality among rent seekers. However, rent seeking also diverts resources away
from productive activities, which, in general equilibrium, worsens aggregate outcomes,
reducing individuals’ labour and asset income and incentives to save through a lower
market return to savings. This general equilibrium effect discourages personal savings
and reduces asset accumulation, increasing the impact of the variation in earnings on
the variation in wealth across households. Non rent seekers are only exposed to this
adverse effect so that wealth inequality within them increases. For rent seekers, the
general equilibrium effect works in the opposite direction relative to the direct effect from
rent seeking, so that the final outcome on wealth inequality among them depends on
a quantitative evaluation of the strength of these effects. In our calibration to the US
economy, we find that a deterioration in institutional quality implying an increase in rent
seeking leads to an increase in overall wealth inequality, an increase in inequality among
non-rent seekers and a decrease in inequality among rent seekers.
Under exogenously determined rent seeking classes, rent seekers enjoy welfare gains,
and non rent seekers welfare losses. Our findings also indicate that the benefits and costs
associated with rent seeking are not distributed equally. On the one hand, the biggest
welfare losses from the increase in rent seeking opportunities are for those with higher
earnings and initial wealth who are excluded from rent seeking because they are most
affected by the deterioration of the aggregate economy. On the other hand, welfare gains
are higher for rent seekers with higher earnings and initial wealth because they have an
increased capacity to extract resources. Despite convergence in terms of wealth among
rent seekers in the stationary equilibrium, rent seekers with lower initial wealth have
lower welfare gains from increases in rent seeking activity; starting from lower wealth,
they extract lower resources via the rent seeking competition in the transition to the
new stationary equilibrium. Under endogenously determined rent seeking classes, rent
seeking implies welfare losses for everyone due to the general equilibrium distortions.
Taken together, our results imply that a reform to improve institutional quality to reduce
3The link between the education of the offspring of the elite and social immobility, and its relation
to persistence of elites, has been analysed across social sciences (see, e.g. Khan (2012), Bukodi and
Goldthorpe (2018), and Milanovic (2019).
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rent seeking would benefit everyone if rent seeking were inclusive. However, when rent
seeking is exclusive, households in the rent seeking class would become worse off. If
we accept that political elites also have a more considerable influence in the design of
economic institutions (see, e.g. Bonica et al. (2013) and Milanovic (2019)), our results
may provide an explanation for the persistence of socially ineffi cient institutions that
permit rent preservation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After contextualising our work relative
to the existing research and empirical evidence in Section 2, in Section 3, we set out an
incomplete markets heterogeneous agents model with financial rent seeking and discuss
model predictions. Then, in Section 4, we analyse the effects of rent seeking on wealth
and welfare inequality, and we discuss conclusions in Section 5. In an online Appendix,
we provide additional information on the data and technical material and a simplified
version of the model with an analytical solution that illustrates the importance of the
general equilibrium effects.
2 Empirical motivation and literature
This section discusses existing research and data that provide the background to study
the link between inequality, rent seeking, and rent seeking intermediation, with a focus
on financial markets.
2.1 Rent seeking and intermediation
Rent seeking is broadly defined as the socially costly pursuit of income and wealth transfers
(see, e.g. Drazen (2000, ch. 8) and Hillman (2009, ch. 2)). A prerequisite of rent seeking
is an institutional failure in the form of poorly defined and protected property rights 4
that allows the creation of common pools or contestable prizes, which, in turn, incentivise
self-interested agents to participate in a Tullock-type rent seeking competition. All this
implies a misallocation of resources so that the society incurs productivity and welfare
losses (see, e.g. Tullock (1967, 1980), North (1990), Murphy et al. (1991), Drazen (2000),
Mueller (2003), Hillman (2009), Acemoglu (2009), Esteban and Ray (2011) and Acemoglu
and Robinson (2019), while for quantitative macroeconomic models see, e.g. Angelopoulos
et al. (2009, 2011)). In practice, rent seeking involves acquiring influence and this can
take various forms like lobbying, campaign contributions, political power, corruption, or
a mix of them (see, e.g. Drazen (2000, ch. 3 and 8) and Stiglitz (2012)). In developed
countries, a key role is played by lobbyists who secure extra benefits for rent seekers (see,
e.g. Hasen (2012) and Igan and Lambert (2019)). Delegating rent seeking to agents who
act as lobbyists (in the form of, e.g. hiring lobbying firms and agents that provide similar
services, or having labour force working in-house in effect as lobbyists) can give rent
seekers a better position.5 These expert intermediaries (e.g. lobbyists) provide financial
4See, e.g. Drazen (2000, chapter 10). For the key importance of property rights among other measures
of institutional quality, see, e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Grossman (2001), Acemoglu (2009, chapters 4
and 22), Besley and Persson (2009), Besley and Ghatak (2010) and many others.
5Indeed, a strong intuitive relationship between rent seeking and lobbying has led economists often
to treat the second as an indicator of the first. For example, Hillman (2009, ch. 2) points out that the
presence of lobbyists is, in fact, an indication that rent seeking is taking place, while the literature has
used the proportion of lawyers in a population as an indicator of rent-seeking activities (see, e.g. Murphy
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and legal advice and mediate with relevant decision makers (e.g. policymakers, CEOs,
managers and their advisers) to influence the decision process in favour of the group that
they represent. The more complex a sector and its policies, the more room it offers for
rent seeking and intermediation/lobbying.
We focus on rent seeking in the financial sector, which, due to its size (see, e.g. Philip-
pon (2012, 2015)) and complexity of transactions involved, is believed to relate to par-
ticularly intense lobbying and rent seeking activities (see, e.g. Stiglitz (2012), Igan et
al. (2012, 2017), Mazzucato (2018) and Igan and Lambert (2019)).6 Evidence from,
e.g. Igan et al. (2012, 2017) and Igan and Lambert (2019) links lobbying activities to
such rent seeking, which can take many forms. For example, it may capture beneficial
access to better credit conditions and directed loans or subsidies to specific industries or
households; preferential access to investment in new or protected markets (including pref-
erential treatment in failed-bank auctions), or in real estate, that imply higher returns;
laxer treatment in the supervision of financial intermediaries, or less costly enforcement
actions (e.g. lower penalties); and guaranteed bailouts (thus reducing the downside risk
and allowing higher risk, higher return investment). Igan et al. (2012, 2017) and Igan
and Lambert (2019) focus on the specific mechanisms linking rent seeking and lobbying
in the banking/financial sector, and provide relevant empirical evidence suggesting that
this lobbying is mainly related to rent seeking.
Our modelling below introduces rent seeking in the financial market to an incomplete
markets general equilibrium model in a reduced form way. It does so by assuming, consis-
tent with the literature, that financial rent seeking requires some form of intermediation
and purposeful activity. Given that our modelling is at the macroeconomic level, we com-
plement the existing empirical evidence on the positive relationship between rent seeking
and intermediation activity, exemplified by lobbying, using aggregate level indicators for
rent seeking and intermediation to acquire access to rent seeking.
We construct a panel country-level dataset (details can be found in Appendix A).
To approximate institutional characteristics that determine the size of the rent seeking
pie to be contested for, we use measures of institutional quality for a panel of countries
constructed by Kuncic (2014). In particular, we use the Economic Institutions (EI)
and the Political Institutions (PI) indices and define the variables QIect = 1 − EIct and
QIpct = 1 − PIct, for country c and period t. Note that a higher value in QIect and QI
p
ct
imply a worsening of institutions. To approximate the extent of intermediation activity
for rent seeking at the macroeconomic scale, we use data on the proportion of the labour
force employed in legal and financial occupations, for 26 countries in the EU, and the
US, since, as discussed earlier, the literature typically links these two sectors to lobbying
and rent seeking intermediation. We summarise the results from a fixed-effects regression,
including a time trend, of rent seeking intermediation activity on the two different rent
seeking proxies (namely, QIect and QI
p
ct), in the first three columns of Table 1.
7
et al. (1991), Hillman (2009, p. 98))).
6Regarding the extent of lobbying from the financial sector, data analysed in Igan and Lambert (2019)
shows that in the US lobbying expenses from the financial sector outspend other sectors. Whereas, in
the EU, data in Wolf et al. (2014) reveal that there are more than seven times more lobbyists in this
sector than in all other sectors together and more than five times lobbying organisations than in NGOs,
trade unions and consumer organisations together.
7The fixed-effects specification partials out variation between countries, exploiting variation over time,
consistent with the absolute measures of economic and political institutional quality that we use. The
time trend controls for general time patterns. Further details and robustness to the sample are discussed
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Table 1: Rent seeking intermediation, wealth inequality and institutional quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
QIect 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(s.e.) (0.002) (0.002) (0.092) (0.092)
QIpct 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.174 0.183
(s.e.) (0.003) (0.003) (0.122) (0.117)
adj. R2 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.913 0.908 0.915
obs 432 432 432 76 76 76
Notes: Results from the regression yct = ac + bt+ cQI
h
ct + εct, for the period 1995-2010, and
for h = e, p, where yct (for country c and year t) refers to share of intermediation occupations
in (1)-(3), and to the share of wealth owned by the top10% in (4)-(6); a higher QIhct measures a
worsening in institutional quality; and ∗∗∗denotes that p < 0.01, and ∗∗that p < 0.05.
Data Source: Eurostat, CPS MORG (own calculations),WID and Kuncic (2014).
Figure 1: Quality of Institutions, lobbying and wealth inequality in the US









annual lobbying on FIRE
institutional proxy: QIpct
institutional proxy: QIect
Notes: a higher QIhct measures a worsening in institutional quality. All variables are detrended.
Data Source: CRP, WID and Kuncic (2014).
The results in Table 1 show a positive relationship between either QIect or QI
p
ct and
the share of financial and legal employment. Therefore, they imply that a worsening (im-
provement) in institutional quality over time is associated with an increased (decreased)
share of the labour force being employed in legal and financial occupations. Given our
focus on the US, we complement the results in Table 1 with Figure 1, which plots, for the
in Appendix A.
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US, the three variables, de-trended by a linear trend, as wells as an additional measure
of lobbying in the financial sector, based on lobbying expenditure data from the Centre
for Responsive Politics (see Appendix A and Igan and Lambert (2019) for more details).
The results show that a worsening in institutional quality is associated with increased
lobbying expenditure and increased employment in legal and financial occupations.8
2.2 (Financial) rent seeking and (wealth) inequality
It is generally recognised that rent-seeking competition favours elites, i.e. agents with
higher socio-political power or status, as well as those with higher wealth (see, e.g. the
literature reviewed in Karabarbounis (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2015)).9 Opportuni-
ties for rent seeking are more strongly concentrated to those with political power and/or
with the right connections, who have an insider position in the economic system be-
cause they are well connected to important private and public decision-makers. The
unequal distribution of socio-political power reflects long-standing processes with strong
persistence; indeed, established elites are typically viewed as family lineages that persist
through time. Moreover, success in rent seeking from the financial sector may increase
with wealth because wealthier households have more opportunities to exploit situations
that create higher financial returns. For example, wealthier households, being insiders in
the financial market, may have better opportunities to benefit from more lucrative invest-
ment opportunities resulting from regulation (monopolies, investment subsidies, credit in
better conditions), or weak property rights (e.g. relating to new technology and markets).
More generally, wealthier households can have better opportunities for rent seeking by
having access to more influential political and economic networks.
To the extent that the opportunity for rent seeking is concentrated on socioeconomic
elites, rent seeking should be associated with higher inequality. Indeed, a line of research
examines the relationship between socio-political elites and inequality since the Neolithic
period, suggesting that extraction from elites is an important contributor to inequality
(see, e.g. Halstead and O’Shea (1989), Halstead (2014), Boix (2015) and Scheidel (2017)
for reviews and examples from pre-history to the early 20th century). The link between
rent seeking and inequality has also been examined in static or two-period economic
models (see, e.g. Dabla-Norris and Wade (2001), Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2006)
and Chaturvedi (2017)).
This paper undertakes a quantitative analysis of the wealth and welfare distributional
implications of rent seeking from the financial sector under idiosyncratic earnings. Data
from the US and from other four countries for which a measure of wealth inequality (the
concentration of wealth at the top 10% of the distribution) can be obtained for the same
period as for the proxies for financial rent seeking (see columns (4)-(6) in Table 1), do
suggest a positive relationship between rent seeking and wealth inequality (see Appendix
A for more details). In particular, the results in Table 1 show a positive relationship
between either QIect or QI
p
ct and the share of wealth owned by the top 10%, implying that
a worsening (improvement) in institutional quality over time is associated with higher
(lower) wealth inequality. The US data in Figure 1 also suggest a positive relationship
8The evolution of the variables’ levels and pairwise correlations between the variables plotted in
Figure 1 are also reported in Appendix A.
9Wealth, status and political power are intrinsically linked (see, e.g. Mokyr (1985) and Perkin (1969))
for a historical analysis and Cole et al. (1992) for an economic analysis).
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between rent seeking and wealth inequality, when the latter is measured by either the
wealth share of the top 10% or the Gini index.
Quantitative analysis requires a model where wealth inequality causes and is caused
by rent seeking success in a stochastic dynamic framework. The stochastic environment
can capture the role of earnings risk, a main driver of wealth inequality, while the inter-
temporal dimension can allow for endogenous wealth accumulation. A vast literature,
based on seminal contributions by Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994),
has shown that idiosyncratic shocks to earnings under incomplete financial markets gener-
ate substantial wealth inequality, which is higher than earnings inequality.10 In this class
of models, a continuum of economic agents receives idiosyncratic earnings shocks against
which they cannot fully insure. As a result, earnings shocks pass through to income, and
hence differences in histories of idiosyncratic earnings create different opportunities for
accumulating assets. In other words, earnings inequality is propagated, via incomplete
financial markets, to wealth inequality. Therefore, the institutional framework regarding
the financial market, and in particular financial market imperfections that lead to incom-
plete markets, is central to heterogeneous agent models. Here, we add a different form of
financial market imperfection, related to rent seeking and arising from weak institutions,
and investigate the distributional effects of its implications.
3 Heterogeneous agents and rent seeking
We build on a standard general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model (see, e.g. Aiya-
gari (1994)). The economy is in a stationary equilibrium where aggregate quantities are
constant and is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households distributed on
the interval I = [0, 1]. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... Households have
identical preferences and derive utility from consuming a single good that firms produce.
Labour supply is exogenous, but each household is subject to idiosyncratic labour produc-
tivity shocks. Financial markets are incomplete, and, in particular, households can save
in a single asset so that they cannot fully insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks
to earnings.
We extend this setup to allow for rent seeking in the financial sector, where rent
seeking requires services provided by specialised rent seeking firms. In particular, we
assume an institutional failure in the form of ill-enforced property rights, implying that
a fraction 0 ≤ θ < 1 of accumulated savings of all households can be diverted away from
productive uses to a group of rent-seeking households, and this takes place via the services
provided by intermediation firms. In other words, the parameter 0 < 1− θ ≤ 1 quantifies
the degree of property rights, and total savings play the role of the contestable prize.
The economy also includes a producing sector, a financial sector that channels savings
from households to firms, and an intermediation sector that rent seekers use to extract
assets from the financial sector. Each of these three sectors is represented by respective
competitive firms.
We will assume that households can belong to two different groups regarding their
potential to extract resources from the common pool.11 These two groups are denoted by
10For empirical evidence, reviews of this literature and extensions, see, e.g. Krueger et al. (2016),
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2015) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)).
11This assumption is related to Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012, 2019) notion of inclusive and exclusive
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a superscript h = e, o for rent seekers and non rent seekers, respectively. Households in
the rent-seeking group (e ) compete with each other for a share of the contestable prize,
and the amount they extract depends on their relative wealth in a typical Tullock-type
redistributive contest. On the other hand, non rent seekers (o) do not have access to the
common pool. Therefore, in addition to differences in earnings due to idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks, households’incomes can differ because of rent seeking via the financial
market, where the opportunity for rent seeking can be narrowly concentrated to the rent
seeking group (e). Conditional on belonging to the rent seeking group, higher relative
wealth allows a household to capture a bigger share of the pie that is available for rent
seeking. In our baseline model, the classification of agents into rent seekers (e) and non
rent seekers (o) will be exogenously set, reflecting the assumption that who belongs to
the elite, or who is an insider, is a result of long standing socio-political processes and the
right connections that are exogenous to purely economic factors. In subsequent analysis,
this classification will become endogenously determined by relative wealth, an outcome
that households can affect by their actions (see subsection 4.2). We also consider the case
where all households appropriate resources via rent seeking. Motivated by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012, 2019), we term the situation in which everybody can participate in rent
seeking as inclusive rent seeking, while the situation where some members are excluded
as exclusive rent seeking.
3.1 Households
The labour productivity of a typical household i in class h at time t is denoted by si,ht . At
the beginning of period t, and before making any current decisions, the household observes
its labour productivity shock and receives labour income wsi,ht , where w is the wage rate.
We assume that the stochastic earnings process is the same for both household types,






, and state-space S = [s1, s2, ..., sm], s1 ≥ 0, sj+1 > sj,
j = 1, ...,m − 1, with the σ-algebra S that is the power set of S. The transition matrix
Qss′ provides the conditional probability that the household will be in state s′ in period
t+1, given that it is in state s in period t. Denoting by πij the elements of Qss′ , we assume
that there exists n0 such that (πij)
n > 0, ∀ (i, j), for all n > n0, where n ∈ N+, and that
π11 > 0. These assumptions guarantee that there exists a unique invariant distribution
(see, e.g. Acikgoz (2018)). We denote the unique invariant distribution by ξ.
All households receive the common and guaranteed return r on their savings and
the same wage rate w. Furthermore, as said above, there are additional returns via
rent seeking, which depend on whether the household belongs to the h = e group and
the household’s relative wealth. We denote the population fraction of rent seekers by
0 ≤ ne ≤ 1, so that, by setting it at different values between 0 and 1, we can examine the
implications of exclusive versus inclusive rent seeking.12 We assume that the institutional
framework allows for a fraction 0 ≤ θ < 1 of total assets, A, to be redistributed, via
rent seeking competition. The amount of this pie that a typical household can extract is
economic institutions. The former provides opportunities to a broad cross-section of society, while, in
the latter, opportunities are narrowly concentrated on elites. In our case, we extend this concept to an
exclusive socio-political system restricting entry to rent seeking competition.
12As said, in subsection 4.2 below, we examine the implications of defining elites that appropriate the
rent seeking gains in terms of relative wealth.
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determined by the function di,ht ≡ 1e
ai,et
Ae
, where 1e = 1 when h = e and 1e = 0 otherwise,
and Ae denotes aggregate savings of the rent seeking class. Thus, conditional on being a
rent seeker, the extraction technology is given by di,et ≡
ai,et
Ae
, implying that the amount of
resources extracted depends on own wealth relative to average wealth of the competitors,
capturing the idea that wealthier rent seekers can extract more resources.13 However,
households - rent seekers do not appropriate the whole amount they extract from the
pie. This happens because they need to incur expenses to participate in the rent seeking
competition, modelled as payments to rent seeking firms, which will be discussed later
(e.g. fees for lobbying, financial and legal advice). Such expenses are determined by the
amount of resources they extract and a price p` ∈ [0, 1].
Households use their income for consumption ci,ht ≥ 0 and next-period wealth ai,ht+1.
Define the set including the permissible values for ai,ht asA = [0,+∞). Market prices, w, r
and p`, as well as aggregate quantities, Ah and A, are taken as given by the household and
are determined in equilibrium. Given the sources of income analysed above, household i
in group h = e, o faces the budget constraint:
ci,ht + a
i,h






t θA− p`di,ht θA. (1)
Define the net interest rate, r̃h, as














Some points are worth making regarding the household’s budget constraint. First, we
do not model the rent-seeking households as choosing which proportion of their assets to
use to achieve higher returns from rent seeking; instead, we let them use all their assets
for this purpose. As long as p` ≤ 1, a rent-seeking household would find it beneficial to
participate in rent seeking with all its assets in this setup if given such a choice. Second,
in this specification, returns to saving (r̃h) at the household level remain independent of
the household’s own wealth and are common across households of the same rent seeking
class.14 Although (1) - (3) does not introduce idiosyncratic heterogeneity in returns to
wealth or increasing returns to savings (see, e.g. Fagereng et al. (2016), Benhabib et al.
(2017) and Benhabib and Bisin (2018) on the importance of these factors), there is a non-
stochastic, ex ante variation in the returns to wealth between the two groups. Finally, p`
is determined in equilibrium, and its main role is to capture household-level costs of rent
seeking that atomistic households take as given (see also Besley and Ghatak (2010) for
different ways to model the resource misallocation costs resulting from weak institutions).
Households have the inter-temporal discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) and use a per period




Ae ) is consistent with Tullock’s (1980) probabilistic contest-success function (see also,
among many others, Murphy et al. (1991), Dixit (2004, chapter 5) and Esteban and Ray (2011)).
14Note that the amount of resources extracted via rent seeking is a positive function of own wealth.
However, because the amount of resources extracted is assumed to be proportional to own wealth, the
rate of return, r̃, is independent of own wealth. We return to these points in Section 4.
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= 0. These assumptions are common in the
literature relating to incomplete markets with heterogeneous agents in general equilibrium
(see, e.g. Aiyagari (1994) and Acikgoz (2018)). The interest rate and wage rate are taken
as given and satisfy r̃h > −1 and w > 0. Moreover, as has been shown (see, e.g. Aiyagari
(1994), Miao (2014, ch. 8) and Acikgoz (2018)), a necessary condition for an equilibrium





We summarise the optimisation problems for the typical households by suppressing the
superscript i so as to simplify notation. Given values of (w, r̃h), and given initial values
(ah0 , s
h










that solve the problem:










where aht ∈ A, cht ≥ 0 is given by (3), and u(·) and sht satisfy the assumptions imposed





























































solve (4), exist, are unique and continuous.
3.2 Financial sector
A single firm represents the financial sector. It borrows all available assets from house-
holds, A, at the rate r, but it lends only a proportion of these assets to the producing
firms at the competitive interest rate rf . In particular, it can only lend (1− θ)A assets
to the producing firms because the rest, θA, are diverted to other rent-seeking uses. This
specification can capture, for example, intervention in the financial market (e.g. directed
loans or subsidies to specific industries or households) or bonuses, payments and other
expenses paid out to managers, shareholders or other individuals. The firm makes zero
profits, requiring that:
(1 + r)A = (1 + rf ) (1− θ)A, or
r = (1 + rf ) (1− θ)− 1 (6)
3.3 Production sector
A single producing firm borrows assets from the financial sector at a constant rental rate
rf . Moreover, it operates an aggregate, constant returns to scale production function using
10
as inputs the average (per capita) levels of capitalKf and employment Lf . The production
function is given by F (Kf , Lf ) and is assumed to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. In
particular, F is continuously differentiable in the interior of its domain, strictly increasing,
strictly concave and satisfies: F (0, Lf ) = 0, FKL > 0, lim
K→0
FK(K




f , Lf )→ 0. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The firm
takes the rental rate, rf , and wage rate, w, as given and chooses capital and employment
to maximise profits. Optimisation gives the standard first-order conditions, where factor
input prices are equal to the relevant marginal products:
w = ∂F (Kf , Lf )/∂Lf , (7)
rf = ∂F (Kf , Lf )/∂Kf − δ. (8)
3.4 Rent seeking intermediation sector
A single rent seeking intermediation firm uses labour input L` (for legal and financial
advice and other lobbying services), which is paid the competitive wage w, to produce





= ZL`, where Z is productivity parameter. The production
of rent seeking must equal household demand, hence:
θA = ZL`. (9)
The output θA is sold to rent-seeking households at the price p`, determining profits,
η` = p`ZL





Note that, given the inelastic demand for rent seeking services from the household prob-
lem, the amount of labour used in rent seeking, L`, is determined in equilibrium by (9).
In turn, (10) determines the equilibrium price of rent seeking services.
3.5 Equilibrium and calibration
The aggregate quantities satisfy
Kf = (1− θ)A
Lf + L` =
∑
j∈S sjξ (sj) ≡ 1
A = Ae + Ao.
(11)
In Appendix B we define the stationary general equilibrium and summarise the compu-
tational algorithm to solve for the stationary equilibrium. We calibrate the model using
commonly used parameter values or information from US data at an annual frequency.
The majority of parameters in the model are the same as in standard versions of the
Aiyagari (1994) model which have been calibrated to US data in the literature (note that
for θ = 0 the model collapses to the standard Aiyagari (1994) model). Hence, we follow
the existing research regarding the choice of these parameters.
We start with the earnings process for st. We assume that labour income follows
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an AR(1) process and, by following Kitao (2008), we set the autocorrelation coeffi cient
equal to ρ = 0.94 and conditional variance equal to σ2 = 0.02. These parameter values
are informed by econometric estimation based on data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) (e.g. Storesletten et al. (2004) and Hubbard et al. (1994)). We
then approximate this AR(1) process with a 9-state Markov chain using the method in
Rouwenhorst (1995). This method determines an equally spaced state-space S, normalised
to have a unit mean, and the 9× 9 transition matrix Qss′ .
The functional forms for household preferences and production technology follow stan-




1− σ , (12)
and set σ = 2 (Kitao (2008)). Moreover, we set the annual depreciation rate to be δ = 0.10
(Krueger et al. (2016)) and we use a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant








where we normalise T = 1 and set α to 0.33 (Heathcote et al. (2010)).
For the benchmark results, we set ne, the population share of the socio-political elite,
to be 10%, which is the share of elementary and secondary school-aged American children
enrolled in private schools (for the link between education and persistence of elites see
e.g. Khan (2012), Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2018), and Milanovic (2020)).15 In Section 4,
we also examine the implications of extending the rent seeking franchise to everyone by
setting ne = 1 and eliminating the elite’s potential for rent seeking by setting θ = 0. We
also examine the implications of letting the group of rent seekers be defined according to
their wealth, in particular those households at the top 10% of the wealth distribution.
The latter is motivated by empirical evidence, which suggests that 10% of the population
holds more than 90% of the financial assets in the US (see Kuhn et al. (2020)). In
other words, we assume that it is the wealthier 10% that have high enough assets to use
them to extract financial resources meaningfully. Therefore, the two alternative ways of
calibrating the proportion of rent seekers, i.e. when they are defined endogenously in
terms of wealth and when they are defined with respect to conditions reflecting social
circumstances outside of the model, imply that the same proportion of the population
extracts benefits from rent seeking.
We calibrate β so that the economy attains a ratio of K
f
Y
= 2.65 (see, e.g. Kitao
(2008)). We calibrate the parameter Z, in conjunction with the key parameter measuring
the strength of the quality of institutions, θ. For the base results, we calibrate θ and Z
so that: (i) 0.9% of the labour force work in the rent seeking intermediation sector, which
is one quarter of the labour force in "Legal", "Real Estate" and "Financial" occupations,
using data from Bureau of Labour Statistics, Labor Force Statistics, from the Current
Population Survey (see Section 2 for details); and (ii) the spread rf − r is 0.0046 which is
consistent with the one quarter of the average financial intermediation costs in Philippon
(2015), which capture the extent of financial frictions (see also Hall (2013), noting that,
in our model, rent seeking is a form of financial friction (see also e.g. Khwaja and Mian
15This share is obtained by NCES (2019) and has been stationary in recent decades, between 11% in
1999 and 10% in 2017.
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(2011)). We discuss sensitivity to these targets in section 4.1 and summarise the parame-
ters for the base model in Table 2. The parameters β, Z and θ will be re-calibrated in
the model variants we consider in Section 4 to ensure these targets are met.
Table 2: Model Parameters
σ ne δ T α ρ σ2 β Z θ
2.0 0.1 0.10 1 0.33 0.94 0.02 0.9630 2.224 0.0046
3.6 Wealth accumulation under rent seeking
Before presenting quantitative results, we study in more detail the main mechanism by
which rent seeking affects household decisions to accumulate wealth by altering the returns
to saving r̃h differently for the two groups h = e, o. Examining this mechanism allows
us to provide a preview of model predictions on the direction of effects of rent seeking
on wealth accumulation and inequality in the stationary equilibrium, and support the
interpretation of the quantitative results in the next Section. Several observations can be
made.
First, for given θ > 0, a typical rent seeker has higher mean wealth than a typical non
rent seeker, so that the group of rent seekers has higher wealth, on average, compared
with the group of non rent seekers. In particular, comparing the net return r̃h for the two
groups h = e, o in (2), we see that, for any r, a typical rent seeker faces a higher return to
savings compared to a typical non rent seeker, implying that in the stationary equilibrium
a typical rent seeker should have higher mean wealth. Indeed, in Appendix B, we plot the
policy functions for rent seekers and non rent seekers for the calibration in Section 3.5 and
see that next period wealth, which is non-decreasing in both assets and earnings, is higher
for rent seekers relative to non rent seekers.16 Given that the mean wealth of a typical
household in each group h = e, o is, in the stationary equilibrium, also the average wealth
across the households in each of these groups (see, e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Miao (2014),
Acikgoz (2018)) and Appendix B), the group of rent seekers should have, on average,
higher wealth accumulation than the group of non rent seekers, leading to between-group
inequality. The quantitative analysis below confirms this model prediction.
Second, for given θ > 0, the variation in wealth within the group of rent seekers,
h = e, should be smaller relative to that within the group of non rent seekers, h = o,
in the stationary equilibrium. This difference occurs because the additional incentives to
save under θ > 0 for rent seekers relative to non rent seekers, which imply that r̃o < r̃e,
also imply that rent seekers’asset accumulation choices depend less on stochastic earnings,
which vary across households, and more on factors that are common across households,
i.e. r̃e. This is manifested by a higher proportional increase in savings for rent seekers
with lower earnings (or with lower wealth) than those with higher earnings (or with higher
wealth). We examine both effects in turn since together they imply smaller variation in
wealth in the stationary equilibrium for the group of rent seekers, relative to the group of
non rent seekers, which is confirmed in our quantitative results in the next Section.
We start with convergence in wealth accumulation for different levels of earnings due
to higher r̃e. By inspecting the budget constraint in (3), we see that an increase in r̃e re-
16The literature has shown that, in the standard income fluctuation problem, both household con-
sumption and wealth accumulation functions are non decreasing in available resources (see, e.g. Aiyagari
(1994), Miao (2014), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017)).
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duces, other things equal, the relative difference in available resources between households
with high and low earnings.17 Because next period wealth is an increasing function of
available resources (see, e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Miao (2014) and Appendix B), convergence
in relative available resources tends to reduce, other things equal, relative next period
wealth for households with high and low earnings. This effect can be seen in subplot (1,1)
of Figure 2, where we show that the proportional increase in next period wealth for rent
seekers relative to non rent seekers is higher (on average across states of wealth for each
earnings level) for rent seekers with lower levels of earnings, compared with rent seek-
ers with higher levels of earnings.18 Given that in the stationary equilibrium households
find themselves, over time, in different earnings states resulting from stochasticity in earn-
ings, convergence in wealth accumulation across the different earnings states implies lower
wealth inequality. Intuitively, within-group variation in wealth in the long run (the sta-
tionary equilibrium) results from variation in the history of earnings, given precautionary
incentives to mitigate against idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. Hence, factors that reduce
the effect of earnings variation on wealth variation tend to reduce wealth inequality. The
additional income opportunity from rent seeking plays such a role19 and tends to reduce
within-group inequality for rent seekers relative to non rent seekers.
We then examine a reduction in differences in next period wealth for different levels
of assets. In subplot (2,1) of Figure 2, we show the proportional change in the choice of
next period wealth for rent seekers relative to non rent seekers, for various levels of assets
and earnings. The changes are positive and more pronounced for rent seekers with lower
current wealth20, for any level of earnings, which tends to reduce within-group inequality
for rent seekers relative to non rent seekers.21 The relatively lower proportional change
in savings for households with higher wealth reflects assumptions on the concavity of the
utility function and diminishing returns to savings that imply an upper bound on wealth.
The assumptions imposed on the utility function guarantee that there is an upper bound
on wealth (see, e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Miao (2014) and Acikgoz (2018)), and imply that for
a suffi ciently high level of wealth (or available resources) households are insured against
idiosyncratic risk so that they stop accumulating wealth for precautionary motives. More
generally, the precautionary savings incentives are stronger for lower levels of wealth or
available resources (see, e.g. Bertola et al. (2014), Ch. 9, and Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2017), Ch. 7). Under idiosyncratic earnings, an increased stock of assets has the added
value that it protects households from possible drops of consumption in the future due to
shocks to earnings. This added value is lower for households with higher wealth because
their existing wealth provides enough insurance. On the other hand, for households with
17Consider e.g. two levels of producitivity, s2t > s
1
t . Then, the relative available resources for two
households with assets at is given by
[










, which is decreasing in r̃e.
18The plots in Figure 2 are constructed for the model with the parameters described in Section 3.5.
19Other such factors that affect the incentive to save have been examined in the literature. For
example, see Aiyagari (1993) for the role of increased risk aversion, which increases savings and reduces
wealth inequality for the same level of earnings variation. Another example that works in the opposite
direction is a tax on asset income in Kitao (2008).
20We plot proportional changes in next period wealth for a subset of possible outcomes of earnings
and assets to illustrate the effects. The monotonicity of the curves shown is maintained for higher levels
of assets and different earnings levels.
21Note that it is the relative (or proportional) change that is bigger for lower earnings (subplot (1,1)
and lower asset levels (subplot (1,2), not the absolute change, which is bigger for higher levels of earn-
ings/wealth (see Appendix B). It is the reduction in the relative gap of wealth that implies the reduction
in wealth inequality.
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lower wealth and consequently with increased exposure to earnings risk, the incentives
to increase savings following an increase in the return to savings are relatively stronger.
Therefore, by providing an additional channel to insure against possible future drops in
earnings for rent seekers with lower wealth, the additional returns from rent seeking work
to close the gap in relative wealth among rent seekers.
Figure 2: Changes in the next period assets









































Note: The scale of the x-axis is obtained by transforming assets in USD, by multiplying by real mean
family income in 2015 expressed in 2019 prices as measured by CPI-U-RS.
Third, in the stationary general equilibrium, and comparing an economy with θ > 0
to one where θ = 0, we should expect non rent seekers’mean wealth and within-group
inequality to decrease and increase, respectively. This is because rent seeking tends to
reduce the return r and w (see (6)-(7)) by diverting assets from productive uses to rent
seekers. The reduction in r affects asset accumulation of the h = o households in a similar,
but opposite in terms of direction, way to how the increase in the return to savings due to
rent seeking affected asset accumulation of h = e households relative to h = o households,
as analysed above (second model prediction). This effect can be seen in the second column
of subplots in Figure 2, which plot the proportional change in next period wealth for the
group of non rent seekers by moving to θ = 0.0046 from θ = 0, for different levels of
15
earnings (subplot (1,2)) and assets (subplot (2,2)). The changes are negative, implying
that wealth is reduced for non rent seekers following the reduction in the return to savings
due to rent seeking (see also the discussion regarding the first observation). Moreover,
the proportional drop in next period wealth is greater for households with lower earnings
or lower assets, i.e. households with lower available resources and lower consumption.
These households are more sensitive to drops in consumption, given the concavity of
the utility function. Hence they need to mitigate drops in consumption from the loss
of asset income, implying that they have to let their savings drop proportionately more.
Similarly, the reduction in w reduces available resources, and in turn, this reduces wealth
accumulation proportionately more for households with lower available resources. Our
quantitative analysis confirms the increase in wealth inequality for non rent seekers when
θ increases.
While an increase in θ unambiguously increases within-group inequality for non rent
seekers, because it reduces r̃o = r, as explained under the third model prediction above,
the effects of an increase in θ on within-group inequality for the group of rent seekers in
general equilibrium depend on the magnitude of the reduction in r, relative to the increase
in returns due to rent seeking. In particular, compared with non rent seekers, there is an
additional mechanism that tends to reduce within-group inequality for rent seekers: their




in addition to the interest rate r. The “rent seeking” part works, as described under
the second model prediction above, to reduce within-group wealth inequality, whereas the
interest rate part works, as described under the third model prediction, to increase wealth
inequality. We investigate these effects quantitatively in the next Section.
Finally, changes in overall wealth inequality depend on the magnitudes of the increase
in between-group inequality and in within-group inequality for non rent seekers, versus
changes in within-group inequality for rent seekers. The quantitative evaluation of the rel-
evant trade-off is also examined in the next Section. However, we note that the discussion
here makes clear that in a model economy where the general equilibrium effect on factor
prices is switched off, then within-group inequality for rent seekers would unambiguously
decrease, while within-group inequality for non rent seekers would remain unchanged.22
However, overall wealth inequality could still increase because of the increase in between-
group inequality.
4 Distributional implications
We employ a counterfactual analysis to demonstrate that financial rent seeking increases
wealth inequality and implies welfare gains to those who have the possibility to extract
resources from aggregate financial assets. We also examine the role of heterogeneity in the
ability to increase one’s income via rent seeking from the financial sector. We conclude
with an evaluation of a tax on the rent seeking intermediation sector.
22Examples of modelling assumptions that can deliver such an outcome include e.g. a situation where
the interest rate is determined in an international market irrespective of local conditions and the wage
rate is determined by non-market factors; or, where rent extraction does not reduce the economy’s assets,
but instead the rent seeking pie is made up of international assets.
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4.1 Wealth and welfare inequality under rent seeking
In Table 3, we summarise the model’s key predictions regarding the wealth distribution
and key aggregate quantities for two different stationary equilibria, one corresponding to
the base calibration and the other representing a counterfactual economy without financial
rent seeking. The latter is obtained as a comparative static exercise by setting θ = 0 in
the base model and keeping the remaining parameters unchanged. We treat θ as the
exogenous factor determining institutional quality, which determines the size of the pie
available for rent seeking, and consider as a proxy for rent seeking activity the proportion
of the labour force working in the rent seeking intermediation sector (L` = 1−Lf). This
measure increases with θ in Table 3, implying a positive relationship consistent with the
empirical evidence in Section 2.
An important result from Table 3 is that wealth inequality is higher under financial
rent seeking, which is also consistent with the patterns in the data in Section 2. In
particular, a value of θ = 0.0046 compared with θ = 0, implies increases in the Gini index
of wealth inequality, while the proportion of wealth owned by the upper two quintiles of
the wealth distribution increases.23 Rent seeking also has unequal welfare implications.
In particular, it reduces the welfare of a typical non rent seeking household populating the
economy in a stationary equilibrium, while welfare for a typical rent seeking household is
increased.24 Overall, there is a reduction in aggregate welfare.
Table 3: The effects of financial rent seeking in the stationary equilibrium.
θ 0.46% 0% 0.46% 0%
Gini 0.623 0.598 Kf 4.245 4.411
Top 40% 0.862 0.845 Lf 0.991 1
Top 10% 0.415 0.385 p` 0.487 -
Top 1% 0.078 0.066 r 0.020 0.022
wealth share of RS 0.232 - r̃e 0.030 0.022
Gini h = e 0.510 0.598 rf 0.025 0.022
Gini h = o 0.617 0.598 w 1.083 1.093
E[ge(ae,se)]
E[go(ao,so)]
2.717 1 Welfare -0.975 -0.960
E[ge(ae, se)] 9.888 4.411 Welfare h = e -0.835 -0.960
E[go(ao, so)] 3.640 4.411 Welfare h = o -0.990 -0.960
Consistent with the model predictions analysed in Section 3.6, under θ = 0.0046,
there is between-group wealth inequality, lower within-group wealth inequality for rent
seekers than non rent seekers, and an increase in within-group wealth inequality for non
23Moreover, the concentration of wealth at the upper 10% and 1% of the distribution increases. Over-
all, the wealth inequality predictions of the model are broadly similar to those of similar models with
idiosyncratic earnings shocks (see, e.g. Kitao (2008)). The benchmark Aiyagari (1994) model under-
predicts inequality quantitatively, especially at the top end of the wealth distribution. The literature
has considered many extensions that improve the predictions of the model, often focusing on improv-
ing wealth inequality predictions at the top percentiles (see, e.g. the reviews in Krueger et al. (2016),
Benhabib et al. (2017) and Benhabib and Bisin (2018)).
24Welfare per class is calculated as the expected utility of a typical household in each class in the
stationary equilibrium, using (12). Welfare for the whole economy is calculated as the weighted average
of these two values under θ = 0.0046 (using the respective population weights), and as the expected
utility of a typical household populating the θ = 0 economy.
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rent seekers compared with θ = 0. Regarding between-group inequality, in Table 3, we
report the mean wealth for both groups for the two economies and note that these diverge
under financial rent seeking, both because rent seekers have higher mean wealth compared
with the θ = 0 economy, and because the mean wealth has fallen for non-rent seekers.
Regarding within-group inequality, we report the Gini indices for the two groups and note
that the Gini is higher for non rent seekers when they are in the θ = 0.0046 economy
than that of θ = 0. On the contrary, within-group inequality is reduced for the rent
seeking class when θ = 0.0046, compared with the θ = 0 economy. Overall, inequality
has increased under θ = 0.0046. We examine in the next subsection in more detail the
last two results, namely the reduction in inequality within the group of rent seekers and
the increase in overall inequality, as they are determined by the quantitative evaluation
of different effects both at group and aggregate levels.
Table 4 presents results for higher and lower targets for the calibration of θ and Z,
implying weaker or stronger underlying institutions and a higher or lower rent seeking
intermediation sector. The qualitative results regarding wealth and welfare inequality
remain unchanged. Naturally, the effects are stronger, the higher the misallocation of
capital and labour, but even with the lower misallocation targets, implying 0.37% of
assets extracted due to rent seeking, and 0.7% of the labour effort at the economy level










θ 0% 0.61% 0% 0.37%
Gini 0.597 0.634 0.598 0.617
Kf 4.458 4.233 4.383 4.253
Gini h = e 0.597 0.495 0.598 0.520
Gini h = o 0.597 0.622 0.598 0.614
E[ge(ae,se)]
E[go(ao,so)]
1 3.276 1 2.384
Welfare h = e -0.958 -0.809 -0.961 -0.853
Welfare h = o -0.958 -0.997 -0.961 -0.986
See Section 3 for details for the data targets. For the base results in Table 3
the targets are rf − r = 1.87%
4
, L` = 3.5%
4
. For θ=0.61%, Z is 2.2208,
and for θ=0.37%, Z is 2.2259.
4.1.1 Group specific versus general equilibrium effects
We examine factors that determine the strength of the group specific and general equi-
librium effects of rent seeking and the magnitude of the change in wealth inequality. We
define as group-specific effects those that work for given r and w because such effects mat-
ter only for rent seekers. The general equilibrium resource misallocation that works via
r and w affects decision making for all households. The return to savings for rent seekers
(see (2)) is affected by the group-specific increase that is due to rent seeking, (1− p`) θAAe ,
and by the decrease in r, which is due to the general equilibrium resource misallocation.
We start with factors that work predominantly via group-specific effects. Group-
specific effects are mainly influenced by how exclusive the group of rent seeking is (i.e.
how small ne is), and how effective or productive the rent seeking intermediation sector is
(i.e. how high Z is). A more exclusive rent seeking, implying that the extracted resources
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are shared within a smaller group (i.e. the ratio θA/Ae tends to be bigger), incorporates
forces that tend to increase returns r̃e more, and thus tends to increase savings for a typical
rent seeker and decrease within group inequality for the rent seeking sector (see discussion
of second observation in Section 3.6). A more effective rent seeking intermediation sector
(a higher Z) implies a lower price for rent seeking, p` (see (10)). This implies that
intermediation costs are lower for rent seekers, which also tends to increase r̃e and thus
increase savings for a typical rent seeker and reduce wealth inequality within the group
of rent seekers. Taken together, these effects suggest that more exclusive and less costly
rent seeking should tend to reduce within-group inequality for rent seekers by more. In
Figure 3, we plot the proportional increase in the Gini index for rent seekers from θ = 0
to θ = 0.0046, against these two parameters (subplots (1,1) and (1,2)), for fixed r and w,
in a standard comparative static exercise, and confirm these effects. As can also be seen
in Figure 3, for fixed r and w, there is no effect in within-group inequality for the group
of non rent seekers, but overall inequality increases, despite the drop in within-group
inequality for rent seekers, because of the increase in between-group inequality.
Figure 3: Change in wealth Gini from θ = 0 to θ = 0.46% for fixed r and w








































































Note: The figure shows the percentage change in wealth Gini from θ=0 to θ=0.0046 for r and w associated
with θ=0.0046. The thick vertical lines correspond to the calibrated values of the parameters in the
benchmark calibration.
Next, we turn to the general equilibrium distortions, which arise because capital and
labour are misallocated, leading to reductions in aggregate capital and firm productivity,
implying declines in the interest and wage rates. Regarding the interest rate, this happens
first because a share of aggregate savings are diverted away from production (there is an
income loss for the financial sector that reduces the market return (r) directly), as can
be seen in equation (6). Second, because of the reallocation of a share of labour to the
rent seeking intermediation sector, the labour input used in production is reduced, and
thus the marginal product of capital is reduced, hence tending to reduce rf and r. On
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the other hand, since there are fewer assets available to firms (due to extraction), the
marginal product of capital tends to increase rf . However, the negative effects dominate
in the results in Table 3, so that r falls. Regarding the wage rate, the reduction in the
amount of capital used for production (because a proportion θ is extracted) also implies a
reduction in the wage rate (w), since labour productivity is increasing in capital. On the
other hand, since there is less labour input available to firms (because of the reallocation to
the rent seeking intermediation sector), the marginal product of labour tends to increase.
However, again, the negative effects dominate in the results in Table 3, so that w falls
(see also Appendix Figure B.2).
Figure 4: Change in wealth Gini from θ = 0 to θ = 0.46%




















































































































Notes: The figure shows the percentage change in wealth Gini from θ=0 to θ=0.0046. The thick vertical lines
correspond to the calibrated values of the parameters in the benchmark calibration.
In Figure 4, we plot the proportional increase in the Gini index for rent seekers, non
rent seekers, and the whole economy, from θ = 0 to θ = 0.0046, against four parameters
that capture essential aspects of rent seeking effects on inequality. In Appendix B we
also plot the effects on the interest and wage rates. We start by examining the impact
on within-group inequality for non rent seekers. Note that for all cases considered, the
general equilibrium effects imply an increase in within-group inequality for this group, as
analysed in Section 3.6.
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First, regarding ne, a more exclusive rent seeking implies a smaller increase in aggregate
wealth due to rent seekers’increased savings25, and thus a smaller pressure on r. In turn,
this leads to a smaller decrease in savings for non rent seekers26, and a smaller increase in
wealth inequality, as explained in Section 3.6. Second, a higher Z implies a bigger increase
in savings for rent seekers (as explained in Figure 3) and a smaller labour misallocation
to the rent seeking intermediation sector. In turn, these two channels tend to amplify the
reduction in r but slow down the reduction in w. The effect via the interest rate dominates
and implies that a typical non rent seeker accumulates less wealth, which, as explained in
Section 3.6, in this environment leads to higher wealth inequality within non rent seekers.
Third, an increase in the risk aversion parameter σ implies stronger incentives to save (to
smooth consumption fluctuations) for given returns and income, and thus implies that
savings are less sensitive to changes in r and w. As a result, wealth inequality within
non rent seekers increases by less as σ increases. Finally, a higher relative productivity of
capital in the production function, a, implies that rent seeking reduces the wage rate, w,
by more and reduces the return to savings, r, by less (see Appendix Figure B.2). For non
rent seekers, who have less wealth and depend more on their labour income, this implies
that the larger reduction in the wage rate because of rent seeking is more harmful to their
savings, thus rent seeking under higher a reduces wealth accumulation more for a typical
non rent seeker, leading to larger increases in within-group inequality.
We continue with within-group inequality for rent seekers. For ne and Z, the general
equilibrium reduction in r with higher ne and Z works to mediate but not change the sign
of the group-specific effects. For σ, the direction of effects is similar (and for the same
reasons) as with non rent seekers, i.e. there is less change in savings behaviour, and thus
in inequality, for higher σ. Finally, an economy with higher capital to output ratio (i.e. a
higher a), also implies higher returns to rent seeking because the rent seeking pie (total
assets) increases. This effect is more important than the reduction in r, so that the effects
of a higher a (and thus A) on r̃e are similar qualitatively to those of a higher θ, working
to decrease within group wealth inequality (see Section 3.6).
Finally, we examine changes in overall inequality, which is determined by changes
in between and within-group inequality. Regarding ne, inequality increases with more
exclusive rent seeking, reflecting the big increases in between group inequality. For the
remaining factors, note that the reasons that tend to increase within-group inequality for
non rent seekers, and decrease it for rent seekers, also work to increase between-group
inequality. Because of the magnitude of the latter, and because non rent seekers are a
relatively bigger share in the population, overall inequality in these cases follows within-
group inequality for non rent seekers.
To summarise, factors that tend to increase the strength of the adverse general equi-
librium effect of rent seeking on savings (the relative importance of capital in production
or the effectiveness of the rent seeking sector) tend to increase the inequality effects of rent
seeking. On the other hand, preferences (risk aversion) that make savings less dependent
on resource misallocation, imply that general equilibrium effects are smaller and thus lead
to a lower increase in inequality. Overall, for empirically plausible ranges of parameters,
we find that wealth inequality at the economy-wide level increases with rent seeking.
25The total wealth owned by rent seekers is lower because they are a smaller share of the population,
even though mean wealth for a typical household in this group increases.
26The drop in the wage rate is also lower for lower ne, which tends to increase savings, but the drop
in the interest rate dominates.
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4.1.2 Welfare gains/losses from rent seeking when institutions change
We next examine the dynamic effects of changes in the quality of institutions. This exercise
allows us to evaluate the dynamic predictions of the model regarding the relationships
between institutional quality, rent seeking activity and wealth inequality, and compare
these to the time series evidence in Section 2. In Figure 5, we plot the general equilibrium
paths assuming that the economy is in the stationary equilibrium summarised under
θ = 0 in Table 3, and at time zero, it becomes known to all households that over the
following 30 years, the quality of institutions will deteriorate smoothly so that in 30 years
θ = 0.0046. We compute the transition to this new stationary equilibrium (for details,
see Appendix B). As can be seen, rent seeking and lobbying activities increase over time,
accompanied by a deterioration in aggregate quantities and increased wealth inequality.
The correlations implied by the time series in Figure 5 are consistent with the evidence
in Section 2.














































































Notes: The circles in each plot in the the last periods indicate the levels in the final steady states (θ=0.00462).
We also examine the distribution of welfare gains/losses, conditional on initial wealth,
for each class. We calculate the conditional welfare change for all households on the
cross-sectional distribution associated with the stationary economy for θ = 0, resulting
from the transition that follows the deterioration in the quality of institutions in Figure 5
(see Appendix B for details). In Figure 6, we plot the consumption equivalent variation,
conditional on initial assets and earnings, υ (a, s), defined as the percentage change in
consumption required to be given to the household under the stationary equilibrium for
θ = 0, so that it is indifferent between remaining in this economy as opposed to the
economy that follows the transition paths in Figure 5. Hence, a greater positive number
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implies larger welfare gains from rent seeking. We plot welfare gains/losses for three
levels of earnings to facilitate presentation, approximately for the 10%, 50% and 90%
percentiles. We plot the relevant distributions for each of the two classes, rent seekers
and non-rent seekers, under the initial economy.
Figure 6: Conditional welfare gains from θ = 0 to θ = 0.46%
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Note: The scale of the x-axis is obtained by transforming assets in USD, by multiplying by real mean
family income in 2015 expressed in 2019 prices as measured by CPI-U-RS.
The first main result from Figure 6 is that an increase in rent seeking implies welfare
gains (losses) for the class of rent seekers (non-rent seekers), for all levels of initial wealth
and earnings within each class. Therefore, everyone in the class of rent seekers benefits
from rent seeking, whereas everyone in the class of non rent seekers loses. As already
discussed, the benefits for the former group result from achieving higher returns for their
savings. At the same time, the losses for the latter are a result of the deterioration of
economic productivity, implying a reduction is aggregate returns to saving and working.
The second main result from Figure 6 is that these gains and losses are not distributed
equally. Instead, welfare gains for rent seekers are an increasing function of earnings and
initial wealth. Those with higher earnings and initial wealth can accumulate more wealth
and thus extract more resources via the rent seeking competition along the transition to
the new stationary equilibrium (recall that rent extraction is proportional in own wealth).
On the other hand, the non rent seekers who lose the most from rent seeking are those with
high earnings and high wealth, because the deterioration in the aggregate economy has
a bigger impact on their income. These wealthy and high earnings households, who are
excluded from the rent seeking competition, will be the big winners of reforms to reduce
rent seeking, while for poorer households the benefits are much smaller. Conversely, the
big losers from reforms to reduce rent seeking will be the wealthy rent seekers, who extract
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most of the resources.
A relevant research programme has examined the distributional implications of fiscal
policy reforms, within the class of heterogeneous agent models, by computing conditional
welfare changes for households with different initial conditions over a deterministic dy-
namic path for policy instruments (e.g. Domeij and Heathcote (2004), and Kitao (2008)).
The wedge in the returns to savings, caused by financial rent seeking and affecting mainly
the non rent seekers (who do not have benefits from rent seeking to trade off this loss),
works, in effect, as an implicit tax on savings. Viewed in this respect, the effect of rent
seeking, which reduces welfare monotonically with initial wealth and earnings for the non
rent seekers, is similar to the welfare reducing effect of capital income taxation (see, e.g.
Figure 6 in Kitao (2008)).
4.2 Endogenous determination of insiders and outsiders
So far, the population fraction of rent seekers (ne) has been set exogenously. In this sub-
section, we explore the endogenous determination of ne, by allowing whether a household
belongs to the group of rent seekers, or not, to be a function of a variable that can be
affected by that household’s decisions.
Figure 7: Conditional welfare gains, inclusive rent seeking, from θ = 0 to θ = 0.46%
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Note: The scale of the x-axis is obtained by transforming assets in USD, by multiplying by real mean
family income in 2015 expressed in 2019 prices as measured by CPI-U-RS.
To demonstrate the importance of exogenous versus endogenous rent seeking oppor-
tunity, we consider as an illustration a stylised environment where the criterion that
determines the existence of benefits from rent seeking activity is whether a household’s
wealth is above or below a threshold level for wealth.27 In this environment, heterogeneity
27We present this extension as an illustrative counterfactual because it is diffi cult to specify and
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in returns, due to rent seeking, arises endogenously. We choose wealth as the variable
defining the determination of the rent seeking group, because, as noted in Section 2, the
link between status and wealth is strong. In this economy with inclusive rent seeking and
endogenous heterogeneity in returns to wealth, the latter are increasing in wealth for a
given household, driven by returns from rent seeking.
We assume that the ability to extract resources from the financial sector requires a form
of socio-political capital, which is a function of relative wealth, and can be augmented by
specific expenses, earmarked to improve one’s social network. Such expenses, for example,
can be joining the right club, frequenting the right venues, and attending the right events,
which are undertaken to gain access to the network required to participate in financial
rent seeking and appropriate resources. In terms of the model developed in Section 3, this
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where eit must satisfy (13). To capture threshold effects leading to rent seeking classes,
we assume that one’s wealth, ait, determines e
i
t via (13), by determining the class that
the household belongs to in terms of rent seeking. In particular, we assume that the
functional form for (13) implies that:
eit = 1at (1− p`) ditθA, 1at = 1, if ait < φA, else 1at = 0.
Hence, the higher the parameter value φ, the more exclusive the wealth/social class
that benefits from rent seeking, since everyone below the threshold level of wealth makes
zero net gains from the rent seeking competition - they are, in effect, excluded from rent
seeking benefits. However, compared with the base model in Section 3, these households
are now allowed to join the rent seeking group, should they accumulate enough wealth over
time. To proceed with the quantitative analysis, we re-calibrate the model parameters,
working as described in Section 3, by choosing φ so that about 10% of the population is
above the threshold in equilibrium. This target implies a value of φ = 2.9.
Results from this model, where rent seekers emerge in equilibrium from households that
are ex ante identical in their opportunity to participate to rent seeking, are summarised
in Table 5, and the distribution of conditional welfare gains/losses in Figure 7.28 For
comparison, we also summarise in Table 5 and Figure 7 results from a version of the base
model in Section 3 in which all households are ex ante identical as rent seekers, by setting
calibrate, in this framework, the latent relationship that gives rise to the emergence of rent seeking elites.
The specification we use below captures key qualitative features.
28Note that under θ = 0, the quantities for the rent seeking group h = e, refer to the household group
above the threshold level of wealth, which is 8.1% of the households in this case.
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ne = 1 in that model. In this case, everyone is a rent seeker and the rate of return to
savings is independent of own wealth. Here the general equilibrium distortions are strong
enough to overturn the positive incentives arising from financial rent seeking for asset
accumulation. As shown in Table 5, when ne = 1 assets are reduced on average and
wealth inequality is increased under θ = 0.0046.29
Table 5: The effects of financial rent seeking, inclusive rent seeking.
endogenous exogenous endogenous exogenous
classification class. ne = 1 classification class. ne = 1
θ 0.46% 0% 0.46% 0% 0.46% 0% 0.46% 0%
Gini 0.628 0.599 0.601 0.598 Kf 4.214 4.393 4.245 4.392
Top 40% 0.866 0.845 0.847 0.844 Lf 0.991 1 0.991 1
Top 10% 0.413 0.389 0.390 0.387 p` 0.490 - 0.487 -
Top 1% 0.070 0.067 0.067 0.066 r 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.022
Gini h = e 0.155 0.148 r̃ 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
Gini h = o 0.577 0.557 rf 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.022
E[ge(ae,se)]
E[go(ao,so)]
6.520 5.749 w 1.080 1.092 1.083 1.092
E[ge(ae, se)] 17.644 18.209 Welfare -0.979 -0.961 -0.971 -0.961
E[go(ao, so)] 2.706 3.167
wealth share 0.426 0.338
of RS
Under the endogenous classification to the rent seeking class, the wealth inequality
implications are effectively as big as under ex ante heterogeneity in rent seeking classifica-
tion and higher than in the situation where everyone is a rent seeker ex ante (compare the
results in Table 5 with those in Table 3). In this sense, therefore, whether heterogeneity
in returns to wealth from rent seeking is pre-determined or arises endogenously (because
returns are an increasing function of wealth) does not matter much for wealth inequality
results. On the other hand, by comparing the results from the two specifications in Table
5, we see that if the rate of return is an increasing function of wealth, then the wealth
inequality implications of rent seeking are bigger, compared with the situation where the
rate of return from rent seeking is independent of own wealth.
Moreover, all households are worse off by an increase in rent seeking under inclusive
rent seeking (see Figure 7), which is different under ex ante heterogeneity, where the
group of rent seekers gains (see Figure 6). Under inclusive rent seeking, even those who
are rent seekers under θ = 0.0046, would have gained from the increased market returns to
savings following a potential reform to eliminate rent seeking. Therefore, mobility in the
wealth ladder under stochastic earnings, and by implication mobility in the rent seeking
ladder, should lead to wider support for reforms that improve institutions. In this sense,
persistence of institutions that permit rent seeking can be linked more to non-market
socio-political immobility, exemplified in the base model with fixed classes, rather than
to an endogenous classification system where one’s relative wealth determines the ability
to join the rent seeking class.
29In Appendix C, we also present a simple model with ex ante identical households that demonstrates




Finally, we examine the distributional implications of taxation of the rent seeking sector
in the base economy with group heterogeneity presented in Section 3. In particular, we
examine the implications of a tax rate τ l = 10% that is imposed on the output of the rent






` − wL`, (15)
implying that the tax tends to increase p`. The results from these policy experiments are
summarised in Table 6, where, in the first column, we repeat the relevant results from the
base case in Table 3 for ease of comparability.
Table 6: Tax on the rent seeking intermediation sector
Bench tax 10% Bench tax 10%
Gini 0.623 0.620 Kf 4.245 4.237
Top 40% 0.862 0.859 Lf 0.991 0.991
Top 10% 0.415 0.413 p` 0.487 0.541
Top 1% 0.078 0.076 r 0.020 0.020
wealth share h = e 0.232 0.220 r̃ 0.030 0.030
Gini h = e 0.510 0.515 rf 0.025 0.025
Gini h = o 0.617 0.615 w 1.083 1.082
E[ge(ae,se)]
E[go(ao,so)]
2.717 2.540 Welfare -0.975 -0.976
E[ge(ae, se)] 9.888 9.369 Welfare h = e -0.835 -0.847
E[go(ao, so)] 3.640 3.689 Welfare h = o -0.990 -0.991
The tax on the rent seeking sector decreases overall wealth inequality, by decreasing
between-group inequality and within-group inequality for the non rent seekers, despite
an increase in within-group inequality for the rent seekers. It also decreases aggregate
welfare, but it improves welfare for most of the population, namely, the non rent-seekers.
The welfare gains for non rent seekers are relatively small. By increasing p`, it reduces
asset accumulation for the rent seekers, which further explains the rise in within-group
inequality and the decline in average welfare within this group, and contributes to the
decline in between-group wealth inequality. However, the decline in the supply of assets
from this group implies that the market return to savings increases, which increases the
supply of assets from the non-rent seekers.31 In turn, this explains the drop in within-
group inequality and the rise in welfare in this group, contributing to the fall in between
group and overall inequality.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered an incomplete markets heterogeneous agent model where
a share of accumulated assets was diverted away from productive uses to a subset of
30To focus on the effects of taxation and partial out effects of public spending we assume that the tax
revenue is used to provide a good that does not enter the household’s utility function.
31See also Angelopoulos et al. (2020) for a different example of general equilibrium effects of savings
from ex ante heterogeneous groups, working via the interest rate.
27
households via rent seeking competition favouring the wealthy. In particular, we assumed
that the amount of resources that can be extracted by the households with privileged
access to rent seeking increases with their wealth, relative to aggregate wealth. We studied
both inclusive and exclusive rent seeking.
For households that have the opportunity to rent seek, rent seeking creates incen-
tives to increase savings, reducing responsiveness of asset accumulation to idiosyncratic
variation in earnings. Conditional on aggregate quantities, this mechanism implies that
financial rent seeking works to decrease wealth inequality among rent seekers. However,
rent seeking also implies a misallocation of resources at the social or aggregate level be-
cause rent seeking reduces directly the amount of savings that can be used for production,
and indirectly the amount of labour that can be used for production. The latter happens
because rent seeking requires intermediation in the form of lobbying services, and financial
and legal advice, which absorb labour services from the producing sector. These effects
tend to reduce market returns to savings and household income, and thus the incentive
and ability of households to accumulate assets and self insure, working to amplify the
effect of idiosyncratic earnings shocks on wealth inequality. Therefore, the general equi-
librium effects of rent seeking work to increase wealth inequality among non rent seekers
and increase inequality between the groups of rent seekers and non rent seekers.
We calibrated the model to US data, and we found that a deterioration in institutional
quality, implying increased rent seeking activity, leads to increased wealth inequality.
Furthermore, rent seeking elites, who enjoy exclusive access to financial rent seeking, also
enjoy wealth and welfare gains, while non rent seekers face losses that are increasing in
wealth and earnings. On the contrary, in the case of inclusive rent seeking in which the
opportunity to appropriate resources from rent seeking is open to all households, rent
seeking is harmful to all, even to those who make resource gains via rent seeking. Overall,
our results underline the importance of the general equilibrium distortions and exclusive
privileges to rent seeking as the main drivers of wealth and welfare inequality. They also
suggest a link between the persistence of socially ineffi cient institutions that permit rent
seeking and socio-political immobility.
We close with modelling caveats and possible extensions. Rent seeking can increase
wealth inequality for additional reasons that we did not study here. These may include,
for instance, stochastic returns to rent seeking, especially in relation to earnings risk, or
a different type of asset being necessary for rent seeking. Also, here we took institutional
quality, as summarized by the economy’s degree of property rights, as given. As is recog-
nized, however, institutions are endogenous, so that a natural question is why societies
choose or end up with socially ineffi cient institutions that do not maximize the welfare of
the majority (see, e.g. Acemoglu (2006, 2009) and Rajan (2009)).
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